

Native Resistance in 18th-Century Amazonia
The "Abominable Muras" in War and Peace

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Five centuries of colonialism and neo-colonialism have wrought continuous and seldom mitigated disaster in the history of every Native American people. Generally speaking, these once numerous and well adapted peoples have been intrigued at first contact by European visitors and their accoutrements, and inclined to receive them hospitably. Then with bewildering speed they have been infected by the Europeans' devastating epidemic diseases, deprived of social and political autonomy, subjected to forceable religious proselytization and obliged to meet to the Europeans' insatiable demand for their land, their labor service and their surplus production. These pressures have obliged the Native Americans to devise modes of resistance to colonial domination; and as resisters they have been subjected to repression and defeat by the colonialist forces. Finally, each people that has survived the holocaust of conquest has been reduced to seeking some sort of accommodation with the new colonial order.

Despite these crippling experiences, a good many Native American peoples have achieved a limited but lasting survival as distinct ethnic groups within the emerging American nations -- if for

the most part neither a happy nor a prosperous coexistence with their neighbors. But most of the native peoples that existed in 1492 did not survive the process of conquest. Battered without mercy for extended periods of time, most simply ceased to exist at some point during the first half-millennium of the traumatic incorporation of the Western hemisphere into the world economy of capitalism. This fate befell them, regardless of whatever last-ditch efforts they might have made to find a basis for peaceful coexistence with enemies so implacable and uncaring as their fellow citizens in the "New World" colonies and nations have for the most part proved to be.

A few Native American peoples seem almost to have understood from the beginning that this tragic story was about to unfold. They saw clearly that beyond a few useful material goods such as axes, knives, pots, guns and woven cloth -- things that might be obtained by trading with the Europeans or by raiding their outposts -- there was nothing in the colonialists' program that could possibly be beneficial to them. Accordingly, they resolved to make no concessions at all to the new order. These peoples adopted a posture of flat-out, immoderate and unyielding resistance to the Europeans; and in some cases they managed to sustain this posture over long periods of time. Although the Apaches and Araucanians come to mind, there were more such resisters, a few on every frontier -- peoples whose struggles were less spectacular or have so far been less well-recorded by historians. (1)

The inclination and the ability of some Native American peoples to maintain resistance to the forces of "civilization" on a continuing basis was something that the colonialists found difficult

to understand and impossible to tolerate. The unconditional resisters appeared to be undeterred by military defeat, by economic deprivation, by their enemies' characterization of them as unreasoning savages, even by severe demographic decline. They strove to inculcate in their children an undying hatred for the persons and the lifeways, as well as for the socio-economic institutions and the religious ideologies of the Europeans. Even after they too had succumbed at length to colonization, they remained unpersuaded by the system. The culturally conscious among them contrived to remain proud, aloof and independent within colonialism's constraints, no matter how humiliating and dispiriting these were designed to be. This fiery sort of resistance was a sign of sheer barbarism in European eyes; and the chroniclers of conquest saw little need either to record it in detail or to try and understand it. It is therefore very difficult for us to see clearly today. Nevertheless the histories of the uncompromising resisters, whatever the particular modes or the long-term outcomes of their struggles, will one day be an important component in the general history of Native America which so badly needs to be written: a narrative of the continuing and partially successful contestation of colonialism, which will in turn be a key chapter in the general history of humanity's effort to absorb, survive and overcome the creation of the capitalist world order.

In Brazilian history, one of the more outstanding chronicles of stubborn Native American resistance is that of the Muras of central Amazonia. (2) The Muras terrorized the outposts of Portuguese colonialism in that part of the world for several decades during the

mid-18th century, and then settled in under Portuguese and later Brazilian government for a century of carefully maintained self-marginalization, and systematic non-cooperation with the emerging institutions of Amazonian society. Little has so far been written about them by historians; and any effort to reconstruct their history is of course greatly handicapped by the fact that all of the documents that exist for the purpose were left to us by their enemies. No European or literate Brazilian seems ever to have learned the Mura's language (until linguists began collecting the few surviving fragments of it in the 20th century); none was well enough acquainted with a Mura person to acquire first-hand knowledge about Mura experience, lore or cosmology; yet several of their European contemporaries felt free to elaborate in their writings and correspondence upon the odd facts, rumor and conjecture that circulated about these people. Those who did so wrote in a spirit rather of systematic abomination than of disinterested inquiry.

Portuguese Amazonia was the State of Pará and Maranhão, an entity governed separately from Brazil, with its capital and commercial center at Belém do Pará by the mouth of the great river. A small number of Europeans and people of mixed race struggled there with decidedly limited success, during the two centuries before the incorporation of most of the region into the Brazilian empire, to extract wealth from its magnificent but not very cooperative natural environment. This they did mostly by exploiting Native American slave or forced labor to gather forest products from a vast hinterland, and to transport those goods to Pará whence, when market conditions allowed, they could sometimes be exported

with profit to Lisbon. Trade with colonial Brazil was made infrequent and unprofitable by the prevailing winds and currents of the "east-west coast" that lay between Pará and Pernambuco. Beyond the narrow strips of land held by these impoverished and isolated but ever-hopeful colonists, a multitude of free Indians -- many tribes settled over a vast territory -- struggled to adapt themselves to the changes which were inexorably being imposed on them from the outside.

This they did in an atmosphere rendered almost apocalyptic by the ever-present horror of Old World epidemic disease. Most of the colonized native Amazonians died prematurely from smallpox, measles or some other unfamiliar ailment. Many did so after having been forceably transported to Pará and subjected there -- far from family and community -- to overwork, undernourishment and frequent physical punishment. Others died of epidemic disease after having attached themselves for survival to one of the European missionaries and transfrontiersmen who presided over a hundred small settlements, which eventually strung themselves out along nearly two thousand miles of the main stream of the Amazon and its principal tributaries, between Pará and the present Brazilian borders with Peru and Venezuela. The conditions of life and labor for these "domestic Indians" of Amazonia -- whether slaves or mission "neophytes" and whether employed in plantations, artisanal workshops, settler households, or the great cargo canoes that plied the river -- were uniformly harsh. This, in brief, was the colonial order against which the Muras would direct their resistance. (3)

Protohistory.

The Muras were probably first visited from afar by Portuguese and Indian slave-raiders and forest product collectors from Pará, who made their way into the valley of the Madeira river, a great southern tributary of the Amazon (see map), toward the end of the 17th century. Unfortunately, no particulars of these earliest encounters have yet come to light. What is likely is that the first foreigners the Mura saw were groups of three or four European or mestiço men travelling in great cargo canoes with crews of twenty or thirty "domestic" Indians from the mission villages of Pará -- all of them speaking the Tupian lingua geral of colonial Amazonian society, which was incomprehensible to the Muras. These expeditions would make camp at any promising spot on the banks of the Madeira and other rivers; and they would scour the nearby woods for the cacao, sarsaparilla and other forest products which were the principal exports of the colony.

The Madeira valley came to be especially reknowned among these commercial gatherers, as the region in which the cacao trees stood most densely in places accessible to the river. After a few weeks, the collectors would load up their canoes and return home to Pará. These men were not at all interested in settlement on the Madeira; indeed they had little interest even in trading with the Indians upon whom they chanced along their way. Neither did they extend the hand of friendship, though most of them were Native Americans themselves. On the contrary, when the opportunity presented itself they would raid the Indians' villages to steal their food, abuse women and then round up a few sturdy young men or women to take back for sale as slaves in Pará.

We can only imagine what the Muras thought of these rapacious visitors, and how they dealt with them; but it is unlikely that in the early years they experienced any devastating attacks at the hands of the cacao collectors, or that they were otherwise provoked into taking armed reprisals against them. For had that been the case, the colonial archives for the period would be full of demands that the government send a military expedition to punish, forcefully resettle and "domesticate" the Muras. This was the fate, for example, of their neighbors the Torás on the middle Madeira, of whom great numbers were put to the sword by a Portuguese expedition sent in 1716 to exact retribution for their attacks on the collecting parties. When that war was over, the Torá survivors were forced either to withdraw to the forest or take refuge in the Jesuit missions which were being established in the region -- perhaps leaving the middle Madeira more open than it had been to free transit by the Muras and other still-independent tribes. (4)

The first formal encounters between the Muras and the Portuguese colonialists seem to have been mediated by the Jesuit mission system itself, during the first quarter of the 18th century. Jesuits from Pará had carried out a reconnaissance of the central Amazon valley during the 1650's and 60's, and soon afterward they had established a base for further expansion on the island of Tupinambaranas, located in the Amazon just below the mouth of the Madeira. From there they began working their way up the great southern tributary, using iron tools and other trade goods, as well as the offer of protection against any enemies, to persuade the Indians of many tribes to settle in their new mission villages. Sometime in

the 1680's, the Jesuits kidnapped or inveigled the son of an Irurí chief to go down the river with them and undergo Christian training in Pará. A few years later, with the help of this agent, they persuaded a number of people from several different tribes to resettle on the Madeira under missionary supervision. This first mission, later known as Abacaxís, was abandoned or moved on several occasions as its missionaries and their followers searched for a healthier, more fertile and more defensible permanent locale. Its inhabitants suffered greatly from a series of epidemics; and at one point near the turn of the century, when for a time no missionary was in residence, they were attacked by a gang of cacao collectors who did not hesitate to carry a number of the newly baptized neophytes off into slavery in Pará. At length, the mission found a permanent location on Lake Saracá, north of the mouth of the Madeira, where it gave rise to the modern city of Itacoatiara.

During the first half of the 18th century, the Abacaxis mission was usually a bustling place with a thousand or more Indian converts of different ethnic backgrounds, living in numerous large multifamily palm-thatched houses which were arranged around the Jesuit's residence and chapel. For many years it was administered by the energetic Father João de Sampaio, reknowned as the "Apostle of the Madeira" for his success in organizing Indian labor to carry out a lucrative commercial production of cacao and of homespun cotton cloth. Sampaio also joined forces with the pioneer Portuguese explorer of the upper Madeira valley in 1723, and founded a short-lived second mission just below the first rapids on that river some 500 miles above its mouth (near modern Porto

Velho in Rondonia, by the Bolivian border). This outpost proved impossible to maintain for logistical reasons, in particular it was said because of the constant hostilities of the Muras and other unfriendly Indians who were situated along the long route of transit up the Madeira for its supply canoes. In 1742, the new mission was relocated downriver to the site known as Trocano (modern Borba), just a few miles above the mouth of the Madeira on its southern bank, which was more easily supplied and defended. (5)

By 1714 a Jesuit stationed at Tupinambaranas had been able to list by name the tribes living along both banks of the Madeira as far up as the first rapids, and by so doing provide us with the first documentary reference to the Muras. They were then the neighbors of the Irurí and Torá, living a bit back from the south bank of the Madeira at what would be the approximate latitude of modern Manicoré; and the compiler of that list did not single them out as a tribe especially hostile to the Europeans. In the early 1720's, however, the government in Pará felt obliged to send a pair of cannon to Sampaio's mission, for protection against Mura attacks. The situation deteriorated steadily from that time forward, for reasons not given in the early Jesuit sources. In 1738 the government's Mission Council in Pará debated the possibility of launching a full-scale war of reprisal against the Mura, and even forwarded a request to Lisbon for permission to do so, though it was forced to concede that at the time it lacked the resources with which to prosecute such a war. In the following year the Crown therefore denied it permission to do so. In 1742 a visitor to the recently relocated mission at Trocano/Borba found that the Jesuit

stationed there had been obliged to have a log stockade constructed around the settlement for protection against the Muras; and six years later a governor of Pará wrote that as a result of the inaction of his predecessors, the Madeira had all but been abandoned by collecting expeditions from Pará. To travel beyond the mission at Trocano was to take one's life in one's hands. The expeditionaries of 1748-49 who finally made it through to open a much-needed permanent supply route up the Madeira to the newly discovered gold mines of Mato Grosso, were widely acclaimed as heroes. (6)

The reports of the great expedition to Mato Grosso say disappointingly little about the Muras, though its soldiers were obliged to fight pitched battles against them on several occasions, and may even have inflicted considerable casualties upon them -- an experience which one historian believes may have taught the Muras the lesson that war against a better-equipped enemy must be fought with guerrilla tactics. (7) The Portuguese found their by now seasoned enemy living in places some two or three hundred miles down the Madeira river from the country in which the Jesuits had originally encountered them -- in particular around the mouth of the Aripuanã river and on lakes and streams lost in the swampy region known as the Autazes, lying west of the lower Madeira and south of the main course of the Amazon, from which it was possible to travel by water over a wide territory between the Madeira, Amazon and Purús without sallying forth onto the much-travelled main streams.

Perhaps the most significant observation for Mura history in the 1749 accounts is that at one point the soldiers recalled seeing

reflections of the fires with which the Muras were burning the forest to prepare swidden garden plots, against the evening sky. This is notable because in later years, the Muras were believed to have no traditional knowledge of the slash-and-burn horticulture of manioc, and to depend upon the settlements of domestic Indians they raided for supplies of manioc flour, the staple food of Amazonia. The Autazes were in any event to become the Muras' principal base during the remainder of their existence as an identifiable ethnic group; how they came to resettle in that comparatively unpromising region is not yet clear; but once there they were certainly obliged to make substantial adaptations to the ecology and environment of the Amazonian *várzea* or low-lying floodplain, in order to survive. (8)

The Jesuit writer João Daniel, author of an encyclopedic treatise on Amazonian life in the second quarter of the 18th century (written from exile, in a Portuguese prison around 1760), provides us with a fuller picture of the Muras than any other early source. Daniel understood them to be a non-sedentary people who lacked permanent settlements and were usually at war with both Indians and whites, roving and raiding over a wide territory from their base between the rivers Madeira and Purús. The Muras had launched surprise attacks on the Jesuit mission stations on many occasions, killing Indian converts and revealing an "undying hatred for the whites, who have given them much cause."

Daniel's explanation for this vendetta was that at one time a group of Muras had been persuaded by a Jesuit to come out of their forests and settle at his mission station. This, it was agreed, they were to do in the following year -- just as soon as he could get

together the supplies of tools, food and cotton cloth which they would require to get them through an initial year of resettlement, while they prepared, tended and harvested their own manioc gardens (an indispensable feature of settled life) at the new place. But before the Jesuit could do this, an enterprising settler from Pará had gotten wind of the plan and had intervened to upset it. Setting out on what was ostensibly a cacao-collecting expedition, he had headed instead straight for the Mura village. There he claimed to have been sent by the Jesuits to fetch the Muras and guide them to their new home. Accordingly, as many people as could get aboard his canoe had set out with him in high hopes of a new life -- only to be tied up by the traitor's men once they were out of eyesight, and taken to be sold as slaves in Pará.

When the Muras who had been left behind learned what had happened, they were confirmed in an attitude of undying hatred for the whites -- and in particular for the Jesuits, of whom they presumed quite reasonably that all their talk of resettlement in a mission village had been a pretext for cruel enslavement. Since that time, reported Daniel, the Muras had engaged in continuous hostilities against all whites and their domestic Indian followers -- attacking mission stations and cacao collecting expeditions wherever they found them. Moreover, they had developed and used with fearsome effect the special tactic of laying ambush from hiding places in the forest, and showering arrows on any passing canoe. So dangerous had they made themselves on the Madeira, he confirmed, that by the late 1740's the cacao crews were avoiding that river

altogether, making their way instead to the more distant and less abundantly endowed, but safer banks of the Solimões.

The Muras' weapons were long bows and arrows, which they preferred to shoot by lying on their backs so as to secure the bow with their feet and project the arrow with such force that it could penetrate the entire body of its victim. They were able, moreover, to thumb their noses at any punitive expeditions that might be sent against them -- because lacking any permanent or concentrated settlements, they were not so vulnerable as others to surprise attacks and to the burning of their houses and crops. Daniel's informants, it seems, had represented the Muras to him as a people with no knowledge of horticulture who lived exclusively from hunting, gathering and raiding. (9)

In the Autazes, as the Portuguese who warred against them were to learn a generation later, the Muras lived in a great number of dispersed *malocas* or multi-family thatched houses located along a far-flung network of lakes and *igarapés* (Amazonian bayous). They learned to travel about in long, narrow canoes made of the bark of a single tree tied together with vines, which carried up to fifteen people and were much faster than the broader and heavier dugouts of most dwellers along the Amazon. The men might live in these canoes for weeks on end during the far-ranging raiding expeditions with which they occupied themselves when the river's waters were low. In addition to maintaining their exceptional abilities with the long bow and arrow, they earned a reputation as the most skillful fishermen and hunters of turtle and manatee in the region. They raised maize and bananas and possibly some manioc in

their Autazes, but continued long after settling there to derive much of their subsistence from the waterways.

In broad terms, what the Muras seem to have done by the mid-18th century is relocate from the comparatively sterile upriver environment in which since pre-contact times they had hunted, fished and cultivated manioc gardens when they were not raiding the canoes of travellers on the Madeira. Their new home was in the much richer central Amazonian *várzea*, a vast territory ranging five to fifty or more miles back from the main stream of the river over a distance of some 1,000 miles, within which the Autazes were centrally located. Much of the *várzea* was a trackless country of flooded forest from June to September, and of myriad lakes in a maze of narrow waterways during the rest of each year. Life there was ordered above all by the annual flood of the great river. There was easy living in the low-water season, when people could raise corn and other short-term crops on fertile mud-flats (when they weren't raiding their neighbors), and do so without having laboriously to cut down and burn over their garden plots -- as they were obliged to do in order to plant manioc on higher, forested, well-drained ground. Great quantities of fish, turtle and manatee could also be taken from lake and streams in the low-water season, with a minimum of effort. Then followed the lean months of the flood season, when every waterway overflowed into the surrounding forests, and people were obliged to take refuge on bits of high ground (scarce in the Autazes), and live mostly off of stored food and corralled turtles, or by hunting and gathering under difficult conditions.

The most successful adaptation to the varzea in pre-colonial times, one which had allowed dense populations in settlements strung out along the main rivers, was to settle on bluffs of high ground near the river and raise manioc on well-drained swidden plots for sustenance during the flood, while making use of the river's resources and the mudflats for the short-term horticulture of maize and squashes during the low-water season. The European invaders, having killed, witnessed the death from epidemic disease or transported most of the aboriginal inhabitants of this region during the 17th century, were devoting great efforts during the 18th to trying somehow to reconstruct a modified form of this ideal aboriginal pattern of subsistence around their mission stations. Great efforts were expended on persuading Indians from dozens of different tribes to resettle under missionary guidance and join the experiment. The Mura outsiders, who moved into the várzea alongside the missionaries and their "domestic Indians," and at about the same time, also sought to make the new environment their own. They can therefore be understood as co-participants in that process of adaptation -- and as competitors for the same limited resources.

The Mura's War against Pombal's Indian Directorate.

The missions of central Amazonia, established above the mouth of the Madeira by religious of the Calced Carmelite and Mercedarian orders, and around and below it by the Jesuits and Franciscans, had come into existence as part of the process of Portuguese colonial expansion through forest product extraction and the operation of a wide-ranging Indian slave trade. This process

had largely depopulated the regions along the main stream of the Amazon during the 17th century, with the missions gathering into themselves a few thousands of its dispirited Indian survivors. Then in the 1750's, along with the rest of the Portuguese empire, the Amazon came under the "modernizing" influence of the regalist Marqués de Pombal regime in Lisbon. Pombal attempted among other things to increase the royal revenues by intervening directly in the organization of colonial production for export. In Pará this reform required establishing a new administration for the Indian labor force. Jesuit missionaries were expelled; and the more pliable Carmelite, Franciscan and Mercedarian missionaries were secularized so they might be kept on as parish priests in their villages -- working now under close government and episcopal supervision.

Indian slavery was at the same time abolished in name, except as a punishment for those peoples who offered armed resistance against recruitment into the labor force. It was replaced with a system of forced government service. The old mission villages were administered by government-appointed Directors, most of them discharged soldiers or non-commissioned officers from the Portuguese colonial army, who were charged with stepping up agricultural and artesanal production as well as the collection of forest products. At the same time, the Directors were expected make Indian wage labor available as needed from their villages, for government projects and for the productive endeavors of the private sector. This new system was designed to profit the European settlers, the officially recognized (or coopted) native chiefs of these

domestic Indian settlements, their Directors, their cooperating priests, and above all the State. It offered few if any benefits to the "domestic Indian" working poor. (10)

The "Directorate" was put into effect in the late 1750's at Borba on the Madeira, and at some twenty other mission villages on the rivers Solimões and Negro to the north and west of the Muras' Autazes -- settlements which were now separated for administrative purposes from the colony of Pará to become the Captaincy of the Rio Negro, with a military governor headquartered at the ex-mission village of Barcelos on the middle Negro. Manaus at that river's mouth, capital of the modern State of Amazonas which has descended from the Captaincy, was at that time only a tiny military outpost charged with the impossible task of helping to keep peace in the region. Soldiers were also posted to assist the Director in each settlement; but there were seldom as many as half a dozen of these at any one place, or two hundred in all the Captaincy.

Directorate settlements were populated by between two hundred and a thousand "domestic Indians" apiece, housing perhaps ten thousand people in all within the Captaincy. Each village had its Director and where possible its diocesan priest, its two or three soldiers and eventually perhaps half a dozen white or mestiço moradores, who were for the most part retired soldiers or slave-traders from the period before the establishment of full-fledged royal government in central Amazonia under the Captaincy. Each of these communities produced an annual shipment of forest products, or salt fish, or baskets of manioc flour, or clay pots of turtle-egg oil or manatee meat preserved in its own lard, or of a limited range of

artesanal products including pottery, crude cotton cloth and exquisitely woven hammocks. These goods were sent down to Pará in the village's own cargo canoe each year, with its Indian crew and usually mestiço captain, to be exchanged there for iron tools, weapons, munitions, raw rum and the paltry luxury goods which the leading citizens of the place might require.

The domestic Indians who produced and transported this merchandise to Pará, and in fact did virtually all of the manual labor of the colony, received minimal wages payable in cloth, tools and manioc flour. They were obliged in addition to devote a very substantial portion of their energies to extracting a bare subsistence for themselves and the moradores -- from their manioc and banana gardens, and from a systematic exploitation of the fish, turtle and manatee with which in those days the Amazon river still abounded.

It was from this chain of primitive "outposts of civilization" on the Solimões and Negro that the Muras of the 1750's and 60's set out to take a large part of their living. The circumstances in which this expansion of their war against the Portuguese took place are not yet fully clear. The lower Negro and Solimões valleys had been severely depopulated by the slave trade and epidemic disease during the preceding century; and in particular there was not a single permanent Portuguese settlement on the main stream of the Amazon (the Solimões) between the mouth of the Negro and the mouth of the Purús, the stretch of river most nearly adjacent to the Autazes. Most recently, a new scourge of measles and smallpox spreading in tandem had reduced the "domestic" Indian population of the entire Amazon valley by perhaps 50% between 1743 and 1749. (11)

Shortly afterwards the missionaries had been expelled in the mid-1750's, leaving a vacuum of authority in the wake of depopulation. That was when the Muras moved; and it is no doubt significant that the settlers' complaints of fierce Mura attacks launched throughout the Captaincy began just as the Directorate was being established a few years later. In 1756, the Mura were still viewed as a problem on the river Madeira alone; by 1758, the new Directors thought they were everywhere -- a fast-moving gentio de corso, living in the canoes from which they carried out their "piratical" attacks on Portuguese and Indian alike, descending upon them wherever they were least expected. Early in the following year, when a party of Mura captives were sent for sale in Pará, the documents attesting to their enslavement gave no indication of names "since no one here can speak their language." (12)

For nearly thirty years after that, the correspondence between village Directors on the Negro, Solimões and Madeira rivers and the governments in Barcelos and Pará was full of piteous complaints of the devastation being wrought by the Muras. Every village in the new Captaincy of the Rio Negro, excepting the two or three farthest up each river towards the Spanish realms in Peru and New Granada (Venezuela & Colombia), suffered at least one Mura attack during those three decades. Most of them were hit practically every year, and many withstood them several times in a single year. In the late 1770's, without diminishing their pressure on the Solimões and Negro, the Muras proved able to make life difficult for settlers at the Directorate town of Obidos near the mouth of the Tapajos, several

hundred miles down the Amazon from their main theater of operations.

None of these settlements, on the other hand, was ever actually burned to the ground and obliterated by the Muras, or even so much as occupied by them. All were simply kept on the defensive, and prevented thereby from ever fulfilling the colonial government's production quotas. Indians from the still "unpacified" tribes were discouraged from accepting the descimento continually proposed to them by Directors and parish priests, and resettling under Portuguese tutelage. Travellers on the river, including groups of domestic Indians engaged in subsistence endeavors of one kind or another, and in particular the crews of the annual canoe expeditions to Pará, were repeatedly attacked and robbed. As a result, trade goods and even the most basic foodstuffs were kept chronically scarce throughout the region.

The government's and the settlers' general sense of helplessness in the face of this menace led an experienced and sober observer of the 1770's to conclude that there were probably more Muras in the captaincy than settlers and domestic Indians combined; and it is possible that he was right. The range of Mura operations was enormous; and often they would strike at places hundreds of miles apart from each other within a single month's time. From this, little by little, it became clear to the Portuguese that the Muras were not a single force of armed raiders, and perhaps had no central authority at all. Rather, they appeared to be a great number of small bands, living in widely dispersed places and operating independently of one another. Most were originally based

somewhere in the Autazes, from which they could fan out to appear suddenly anywhere. But in later years they came to have multiple headquarters, in the lakes north of the Solimões between the rivers Negro & Japurá, in the valley of the Jurúa river far to the west, in the neighborhood of Lakes Manacpurú and Saracá across from the mouths of the Purús and Madeira, and perhaps elsewhere. (13)

The war waged by the Muras was a model of what today we would call guerrilla warfare. (Interestingly enough, that term itself, which does not appear in the 18th century documents, was first applied to the Mura resistance by a priest writing in the 1820's, quite soon after the defenders of Spain and Portugal against the Napoleonic invasion had put it into Iberian dictionaries). In the annual vazante or low-water season, Mura bands would lurk about near the Directorate settlements and fall on canoes coming and going from them, or on small groups of people as they worked their outlying manioc gardens or fished along the river. The standard procedure was to kill the men, perhaps mutilating their cadavers to get the maximum terrorizing effect, to capture the women and children along with whatever food and useful equipment they had with them -- and then to pull up the settlers' manioc plants, or tear down their turtle-corrals or steal or burn their laboriously crafted canoes, or do whatever else they could do to sabotage the enemy's subsistence. Soon the Directors were reporting that it was impossible to get people to work gardens located at any distance from their villages, or to sally forth in small unarmed parties to fish, or to hunt turtle and manatee, even to feed their families.

Canoe crews would be ambushed from behind forest cover, where the bank of the river was high, or where the route passed by an enormous sumaumeira tree from whose branches they could be showered with arrows. It became dangerous to take shortcuts through the narrow igarapés that paralleled the main course of a river, or in general to be found anywhere outside a village unless in the company of several armed men. Curiously enough, the Muras themselves seem never to have learned the use of firearms in the 18th century; and it seemed to the Portuguese that they retained their fear of the loud explosions caused by these weapons for a very long time. In 1782, when Mura attacks on the more populous and better-defended settlements were growing bolder and more frequent, an officer wrote that "they no longer seem to fear the sound of our military drums, which they hear every day, or that of repeated rifle fire." (14) It is also remarkable that although they were recognized by their enemies to be unerring bowmen, the Muras seem never to have made use in warfare of the poisoned arrow-tips which were standard equipment for Indian fighting-men in other parts of Amazonia. This was perhaps because they thought that these weapons were beneath the dignity of fighting man, or because they had no regular trading connections with the peoples who specialized in the manufacture of curare and other poisons useful for this purpose.

Often in the wake of a Mura attack, the Director and a few soldiers and domestic Indians would set out in pursuit of the raiders; but as a rule they were unable to find them, or to catch up with them in their slower canoes, and always they were afraid to

pursue them far from home. The Mura had mastered the intricate labyrinth of river-and-lake passages through the interfluves of several thousands of square miles of the central Amazon valley; and they seldom travelled the main streams except when they came out to attack. In the flood season, they would make their way back to the Autazes or some other place of refuge, and rest up for another season of warfare.

Only occasionally, as in 1765 and again in 1779, did the Captaincy manage to muster its forces for a full-scale attack, by "armies" of a few hundred men, against the Autazes itself. Then the government forces might succeed in killing a considerable number of the Muras, persuading some bands to leave in search of even safer places of refuge. When the soldiers, settlers and domestic Indians would run across encampments of the hated enemy, they would practice the same barbarities upon them that they had been in the habit of complaining about in their reports to the colonial government about this war. They slaughtered the men and they captured the women and children, dividing these among themselves as slaves, or sending a few of them downriver for sale in Pará. (15) Attempts by a few high-minded government officials to prohibit such practices came to naught.

Matias Fernandes, a Director and seasoned veteran of the Mura wars, wrote in the 1770's that in order to destroy this pernicious enemy, it would be necessary to send out a large expedition prepared to carry on a war without mercy against them, for as long as five years if necessary, and to fight it on many fronts simultaneously -- using poisoned arrows as well as firearms. The

soldiers required for such harrowing duty, he believed, should be seasoned domestic Indian recruits rather than "tenderfoot" white men from the colonial garrisons of Pará; three or four white men to lead each squadron would be sufficient. Care should be taken to make as many of the Mura captive as possible; because this would help compensate the soldiers, and because if the soldiers were not allowed to take slaves among the enemy, they were likely as he had seen them do, to grab any Mura babies they found by the legs and beat out their brains against the trunks of trees. It were far better, he thought, to save the lives of the captives and enable them to become Christians and laborers useful to the State, than to give free rein to such excesses. Nevertheless, when a full-scale military campaign was attempted once again in 1779, the governor's report on the resulting victory spoke of 781 Muras killed and only 130 taken prisoner. (16)

No general casualty figures exist for this war, although some may eventually be compilable. The standard armed encounter was of parties of a dozen or two people on one side, and even less on the other; and it might leave half a dozen people dead with as many taken captive. The general impression is that perhaps a hundred people a year were killed on each side during three decades except when a major government expedition was underway, and that half as many may have been captured from each side. The Mura appear to have been at least as interested in capturing women and children from the settlements, to increase their numbers, as were the settlers to capture them for profitable sale. In all, these losses must nevertheless have made substantial dents in the miniscule

populations of both Mura villages and Directorate settlements on each occasion, just as the brutality of attacks was purposefully destructive of the fruits of people's labor on each side. These characteristics may perhaps stand as a sufficient explanation for the continuing ferocity of this war.

It was, however, a struggle in which neither side could ever claim a decisive victory. The resources of the Captaincy for fighting the Mura were extremely limited. Men and weapons were scarce; the frontier soldiers expected to do the fighting were so poorly and so irregularly paid, and the possibilities for booty in the poor Mura villages were so limited, that they were unlikely to take great risks in the King's service. Requests for help from Pará were sent in vain. From the Muras' point of view, perhaps, the hostilities represented a continuing opportunity for small-scale raiding to meet their needs for tradegoods, foodstuffs and additional people. For the Portuguese colonial outposts in central Amazonia, it was an uphill struggle and very discouraging to everyone involved. One result of the conflict was that the villages were kept so hard-put to produce a surplus, that they were seldom able even to provide the manioc flour required to feed a visiting contingent of soldiers. People were afraid to go out to their isolated gardens even to harvest them; and the chronic scarcity of food was such that it usually seemed to the Directors to be more essential to keep their people fishing and raising manioc as best they could, than to send them out to fight the Mura. Everyone in the Captaincy was in agreement that the Muras represented the single greatest barrier to its economic development and prosperity.

If we stand back a bit from the documents on this period of unmitigated hostility, it is possible to get an approximately clear picture of what the Muras were up to. One of the striking things about the story is that it seems clear that these guerrilla fighters preferred to eat away at the outlying Portuguese establishments, and to make life permanently difficult for them, rather than destroying them altogether. For all the Muras' fear of firearms, there were several points at which individual settlements were reduced to so parlous a state that that they might easily have been invaded, occupied, depopulated, burned and perhaps subsequently kept from reestablishing themselves. But the Muras never did that to any town, just as they apparently never slaughtered an entire canoe expedition which they ambushed along the river. Survivors always managed to return home to tell the terrifying tale.

Their goal seems rather to have been to equip themselves in the first place with European tools, and with the canoes and foodstuffs which their way of life left them little time to produce for themselves. In particular they always went after a settlement's stock of manioc flour, which they seem by the peak years of the war to have come to regard as a luxury item. In the second place, they sought to replenish the losses in population inflicted upon them by their enemies, by incorporating into their ranks people who could offer only minimal resistance. The Portuguese (projecting their own habits of mind) thought that the Muras' object in capturing women and children was to provide themselves with a servile labor force; but there is no evidence of their having engaged in any productive endeavor which would have required such service. Later, it would

become clear even to the Portuguese that these captives had been welcomed into full membership and even leadership in Mura society.

Finally, the Muras were at pains to create and maintain about themselves a protective aura of terror, of ferocity and unpredictability which would prevent their enemies from mobilizing effectively against them. Contemporary Portuguese observers quite naturally saw this struggle very differently, believed that the Mura were indeed bound on destroying them, their Indian allies and their modest outposts of European civilization altogether. Even the colonial Governor, far away in Pará, could write in 1783 that "the hostilities and cruelties of the Mura in the Captaincy of the Rio Negro have... [since the mid-1750's]... been another recognized and insuperable obstacle to the progress of agriculture and commerce among those long-suffering settlers." (17)

The Mura resistance had an additional characteristic which was not fully recognized by Portuguese observers at the time. The well-hidden Mura *malocas*, located as they were in barely penetrable swamps, or at the headwaters of small tributaries or on small lakes lost in the forest, served not only as bases for guerrilla raids upon the domestic Indian villages -- but also as places of refuge from them. One of the most serious problems for the administrators of the Directorate's system of forced labor in Amazonia was chronic desertion. Great numbers of the domestic Indians settled in the ex-mission villages sooner or later simply took leave of the oppressive labor system in which they found themselves. This was something that was relatively easy for them to do, when people were

sufficiently angered by the long hours, the poor pay, and the excessive floggings, or by the government's interference in their private affairs, or by any other abuses, to be willing to leave behind the relative security of domestic Indian life, and set out on their own. Runaway villages or mocambos proliferated throughout the Captaincy in the third quarter of the 18th century, performing a similar function to that of the maroon settlements engendered by Afro-American slavery in other areas of colonial America. In time, it developed that many of these mocambos were Mura settlements, or settlements which were joined and eventually absorbed by the Muras.

One result of this blending was that "Mura" eventually became a synonym in frontier colonial parlance for an outlaw living in defiance of the labor system. At one point four refugee domestic Indians were captured on the Negro river and sent down to Pará to be punished for the crime of having made their living by raiding settlements in imitation of the Mura, and for having left signs to make people believe that they were Muras! (18) There may have been a few deserters from the Portuguese military among the Mura bands; there were certainly a good many mestiços from the river towns, and a few Black people. (19) These renegades, like the captives taken from Portuguese settlements, were quickly and thoroughly assimilated into Mura society, often emerging as leaders within it; and they in turn had an impact on the direction of Mura cultural change. Reports of a raid made in 1782 against Maripí on the river Japurá included the alarming novelty that before being beaten back the attackers had threatened to burn that village to the

ground. They were led, the defenders noted, by "a mulatto and a Black...and it was they who had conceived the diabolical idea of burning the town, something the Mura had never done." (20) In time, race mixture made its mark on the physical appearance of the Mura. By the 19th century, travellers would describe them as people with lighter complexions than the other Indians of the region, with hairy faces and chests, and matted, kinky locks. There is some evidence too that the introduction of these refugees from the Amazonian labor system may have contributed to stiffening the Mura resistance, as well as helping them learn the Europeans' tactics and overcome the fear of firearms

Finally, it must be noted that by the 1780's the Mura tribe had come to include not only captives and refugees from the domestic settlements, but splinter groups of other non-pacified tribes as well. The Mura seem both to have raided other tribes for captives, and to have incorporated whole communities of people no longer able to make it on their own. That was true, for example, of the Iruris from the Madeira who were found living under their own chiefs among the Mura of the Autazes, yet being referred to as Mura by the Mura themselves. A Portuguese officer wrote in 1785 that "the empire of these miserable wretches is large, composed of many different languages and of people kidnapped from the villages and who have taken refuge among them, all going by the name of Mura."

Peace.

In 1784 and 1785, something astonishing transpired along the Portuguese-Mura frontier. The Mura declared peace. This was so

unexpected by the Portuguese that they were incredulous at first, and then unanimous in attributing it to Divine intervention. One of them even wrote a school-boyish epic poem called the Muhráida about the event, in which the principal protagonist is an angel sent from Heaven to talk the Mura out of their savage ways. (21) The scene of this startling turn of events was an exceptionally vulnerable Portuguese outpost far from the Autazes, on the lower Japurá river. The Director there was Mathias Fernandes, the doughty Indian fighter whose observation about the killing of Mura babies is quoted above; and it was especially surprising that the Muras would choose precisely his village as the place at which to make the breakthrough. Perhaps Fernandes had earned a grudging sort of respect from his enemies; but he had administered no telling defeat on them in recent memory, had enjoyed no previous friendly contacts with the Muras as far as anyone knew, and seems to have been as astonished at what happened as everyone else.

The Japurá runs into the Amazon just across from the important town of Ega (modern Tefé), which in the mid-1780's was the scene of bustling activity as headquarters for a Portuguese and Spanish joint Border Commission which had been sent to locate for once and for all the frontier between the two empires in central Amazonia. Between officers, soldiers and retainers there were several hundred more people to be fed and supplied in Ega and environs than had been present on the entire Solimões some five years before; and the pressure was on for the Directorate villages throughout the Captaincy to produce locally as much as possible of what was needed. A greatly increased canoe traffic moved about in

all directions; surveying expeditions pushed far up the Japurá-Caquetá and the Içá-Putumayo valleys towards New Granada. (22) Despite the provision of armed guards to all travellers, the Muras appeared to both the Spanish and the Portuguese officials to have been concentrating their predations in precisely the area around Ega since the Border Commission arrived -- while at the same time maintaining hostilities against the settlements on the Negro and Madeira. They had even, if anything, become bolder and more ferocious than ever in their attacks. The fear of them among the domestic Indians and soldiery was at an all-time high; as was official consternation about how to meet the steadily increasing Mura threat.

That was the general situation on the day in July, 1784, when a group of Muras arrived at Fernandes' village of Maripí on the Japurá, making signs of peace and asking for gifts of tools. Their spokesmen were five Indians born in the Portuguese settlements, who had been captured by the Muras as children many years before and had since become fully assimilated into the tribe. Unlike most Muras, therefore, they were able more or less to make themselves understood in the *lingua geral*. These men reported that there were many more people like them living among the Muras, that in recent years they had gotten themselves into positions of influence with some of the Mura chiefs, and that they were now able to promise that they and their friends would make no more attacks on the Portuguese canoes and settlements. Behind them they warned, however, that there remained a great many more Muras "who do not allow speakers of *lingua geral* into their villages, who do not forgive,

and who will kill anyone they find." (23) For this reason their task was a difficult one, the peacemakers asserted; but with a little cooperation from the Portuguese, they hoped to be able to reach those people as well -- and to persuade them all to put down their weapons and enter into a new relationship with the colonial authorities which would be based upon peaceable trade.

Fernandes, full of suspicion, gave these emissaries a couple of dozen knives, an ax, a harpoon and a bushel of farinha -- just to see if by these means they could be persuaded to go away quietly, since at the moment he was too short of people to put up a fight. The Mura then left in apparent contentment, saying that they were off up the Japurá to make war against some enemies of theirs, and to gather up some turtles (a chief source of food during the flood season) with which to repay the Director for his kind gifts. Once they had destroyed their enemies' manioc gardens, they vowed that they would return.

Six months later, the same group indeed came back to Maripí - - this time accompanied by a larger party including an actual Mura chief and several women. They brought with them the promised turtles and a quantity of sarsaparilla root (prized in the markets of Pará), as gifts for the Director. In that parley they announced that they were on their way to the established Mura camp on nearby Lake Amaná, where they planned to explain to some relatives the possibilities inherent in this new relationship with the whites. To celebrate the occasion the Mura women were each given a mirror, a necklace and some beads; and each man got a knife, a Jew's harp, three fishhooks and three steel arrow-points. The chief received in

addition three sickles, three axes and two bushels of manioc flour. Pleased with these presents, he astonished the Director by agreeing on the spot to travel with him down to Ega for an interview with the Portuguese commander -- from whom it was understood from the start that he would receive more gifts, and with whom he declared that he was willing to work out the terms of a new friendship between their peoples.

That historic interview occurred only a few days later at the Portuguese headquarters, where the military commander offered the appropriate presents and assurances of peaceful intentions. Then he gave orders that his men were to observe the peace in all future dealings with Mura who showed themselves to be friendly, and wrote to the governor at Barcellos to express both amazement and a boundless optimism about the prospects for peaceful relations. The governor replied favorably, instructing him to continue these negotiations and exchanges and to do his best to persuade the Muras to accept Christian baptism and to acknowledge their status as vassals of the Portuguese queen -- a sovereign who, he was to assure them, was disposed now to view them kindly and reward their loyalty, but who would crush them mercilessly if they betrayed her trust.

The principles of the ceremonious exchange of forest products for invaluable tools, cloth and occasional gewgaws had been hammered out over a century and a half of interaction between Indians and Europeans in the central Amazon valley; and they had now apparently been explained in advance to the Mura leaders by their captive interpreters. This exchange was, indeed, to be the

basis for the entire process of what the Portuguese chose to call the "pacification" that ensued. A village Director or any other Portuguese official was more than happy to make a few gifts at the outset of any discussions with the Muras, as an earnest of peaceable intent and in the hope of placating a much-feared enemy; but very soon thereafter he expected on behalf of the Royal Treasury (from whose warehouses such trade goods were usually obtained), to be repaid in forest products saleable in Pará for at least the value of the goods given. Both he and the individual settlers and domestic Indian principais (chiefs) who soon got involved in this trade were quick to lose patience if no profits (however miniscule) were to be made on the deal. In the absence of such mutually beneficial exchanges, moreover, the resources of the always-impooverished colonial Treasury would in any event quickly have become exhausted. Careful accounts were therefore kept of the goods given and received, and exasperation would flow freely when ever the Muras tired of their side of the bargain.

The Muras, for their part, were quite willing to gather forest products and in particular to fish or to hunt turtle or manatee (their own preferred activities, and the activities at which they excelled), in order to exchange these things which were easy for them to come by while pursuing the normal routine of their lives, for the invaluable metal tools and other trade goods which the Portuguese alone could make available to them. They could experiment with these exchanges over an extended period without making any critical changes in their lifeways; and so long as they retained a measure of political and cultural autonomy and were free, in

particular, from the exactions of the Amazonian system of forced labor to which all domestic Indians were subject, they would appear to be sufficiently contented with the new pattern of interaction. What emerges clearly from all subsequent travellers' writings about the "pacified" Mura, however, and about the ways in which they were viewed by the "civilized" folk of Portuguese Amazonia, is that at no time did the relationship evolve into a blending through widespread intermarriage and cohabitation, or into a reconciliation based on the mutual acknowledgement of worth or of the benefits one party was receiving from the other. The settled Muras would subsist as a despised and marginal sector of the population of central Amazonia during the remainder of their existence as a separate people; and so far as the occasional traveller can tell us, the Muras continued to view white people and their Indian collaborators with an unallayed distrust and hostility.

The de facto peace agreement between the Muras and the Portuguese was nevertheless hammered out quite smoothly over the following few months of intermittent discussions -- without, it is worth pointing out to North American readers, any recourse to the mockery of a formal treaty. Its main new feature was that in addition to suspending hostilities the Mura agreed to gather themselves into a small number of permanent settlements with a few hundred people in each, where with tools provided by the Portuguese they would build themselves multi-family houses, open forest plots and plant manioc and banana gardens with tubers and cuttings obtained from their new neighbors. This was to ensure that they could feed themselves without stealing, and help them over the

medium term to blend in with the domestic Indian population of the Captaincy. Houses were built with the help and under the supervision of Indians from the Directorate villages, since by the official standards of that day the Mura were shockingly careless about their living arrangements. From these new settlements, it was agreed that the Muras would carry on the production of a variety of much-needed goods for trading with the local representatives of the Portuguese government, as well as with members of the tiny "private sector" of the frontier.

The Muras gained from this agreement a guarantee of freedom from any random Portuguese attacks. They could count on a more or less steady supply of what were by now for them the essential tools and other manufactured goods which they were unable produce for themselves. Unlike other settled Indians in the region, they would be allowed for the time being to attempt to remake their lives in autonomous, self-governing communities without resident Directors, soldiers or Portuguese priests. This last provision could only be regarded as a temporary expedient by the Portuguese authorities, allowable until the still-skittish Muras could be "domesticated" by their interactions with other inhabitants of the Captaincy. No exceptional status or "reservation" status was legislated for them; and in the long run they were expected to take their places in the working population of the colony, and fall under the regular system of local administration. Among the Muras, we may assume, the comparative autonomy allowed them must have been seen as an essential condition for accepting the new terms of relationship.

The Muras were encouraged to relocate in places as near as possible to the existing Portuguese settlements, although concern was expressed privately by some officials lest they gather in groups so large as to represent a greater military threat than before. (The Governor, for his part, would have preferred to ship the lot of them to scattered locations a thousand miles away in Pará!). Accordingly, the embryonic settlements were situated at considerable distances from one another. All chose sites on lakes near a principal river which were accessible by water, yet a bit off the track of most traffic to the Portuguese settlements -- sites where there was good land for horticulture and ready access to fish, turtle and manatee. The first of these was on Lake Amaná near Mathias Fernandes' village, though later it was moved to the south bank of the Solimões near Ega in an effort to escape the terrible epidemic fevers that ravaged the lower Japurá. Others formed during the succeeding months, as one chief after another would visit the nearest Portuguese official to express his acceptance of the terms on which his people might gain access to European trade goods without immediately endangering either themselves or their way of life. One was on Lake Mamiá near the village of Coarí, east of Ega; another was at Lake Manacapurú on the north bank just west of the mouth of the Negro; a third was near Lake Saracá across from the mouth of the Madeira; and another was near Ayrão on the middle Negro (see map). (24)

Each of these settlements had by actual count a population of between two and three hundred people during 1786 and 1787, though the numbers seemed to the occasional Portuguese visitor to

fluctuate considerably from season to season. At any given moment a good many of the men, at least, would be off on fishing or collecting expeditions if not raiding and fighting their older Indian enemies, while their children were left in the charge of their mothers and the old or infirm. This feature of life in the newly settled communities was itself a sign of their confidence in the safety provided by the newly established peace with the Portuguese.

Throughout the process of reaccommodation, Portuguese officials treated the representatives of Mura groups with the greatest possible care and ceremony, despite the revulsion with which they viewed them (and which is sometimes betrayed in their official correspondence). The officers were as generous with gifts as their modest stores of essential supplies allowed; and in any event they were under strict orders to do nothing which might arouse the Muras' suspicions or give them cause for resentment. No labor demands of any kind were levied at first on these cautiously admitted new allies and potential subjects; no missionaries pestered them; and to a great extent they were indeed left to their own devices.

A curious feature of this peace-making process, if we consider the extremely decentralized character of Mura political organization, was the rapidity with which the new terms of relationship to the Portuguese were first communicated among Muras everywhere, and then accepted by them. To prevent unfortunate incidents during the transition, it had been agreed at Ega that Portuguese parties would be instructed never to attack the Muras whom they encountered on their travels; rather, they were to

approach them in friendship and offer them gifts. These instructions, implausible at first, were violated by a few canoe captains in the first weeks, but then seem for the most part to have been followed to the letter. Muras, for their part, were to approach any Portuguese canoes they ran across shouting the password "Camarada Mathias," in honor of the Director who had first received them on the Japurá. Thus they would make clear that they were friends and not foe; and indeed several reports indicated that such encounters actually took place on a regular basis, during the weeks and months that followed, at several different locations at a great distance from one another, along the lower Negro and Solimões. Mura emissaries seem to have travelled very swiftly through the entire length of their territory with the unexpected message of peace; and there is some evidence that they may even have conveyed a threat of violent retaliation against those who refused to cooperate with the new strategy. In any event they were sufficiently successful at the task of persuasion so that within a year's time the Muras were approaching domestic Indian villages in friendship everywhere in the Captaincy. For some reason, it is reasonable to conclude, by 1785 the Muras bands in general felt themselves ready for a change.

One of the principal actors in this drama of reconciliation was a "Murified" captive from the Portuguese settlements named Ambrozio, the one individual Mura participant about whom any particulars emerge from the documents. He was the son of a domestic Indian couple who had withdrawn in disgust from the Carmelite mission village of Paraguarí on the Solimões some time in

the late 1740's, following a disagreement with the missionary there. The family had gone to live in a mocambo situated on a lake somewhere north of the Solimões, led by an an "outlaw" from the Manao tribe of the middle Rio Negro -- a people who had been defeated in war with the Portuguese some twenty years before that time, and had since then been greatly diminished by the slave trade, despite their own concerted efforts to accommodate themselves to the Portuguese presence by collaborating in the conduct of that trade. (25) Ambrozio's people had lived there in peace for some years, until that settlement was attacked and absorbed by a party of Muras -- who had killed the Manao chief and all the men they captured (including, presumably, Ambrozio's father), and adopted their wives and children.

Ambrozio and his mother, Joanna, had then been taken to the Autazes, where the boy had been raised as a Mura and fitted out with the Mura warrior's frightening get-up of two large animal teeth, or bones of the giant *pirarucú* fish, inserted into holes in his upper and lower lip. One of his sisters (described as a *mameluca*, which suggests the possibility that there was an additional union between Joanna and a visitor from Pará at some point early in this story), had eventually left the Muras and made her way back to their home town (by then reconstituted as the Directorate village of Nogueira, near Ega on the Solimões). A brother or cousin had grown up to serve as the principal domestic Indian justice official in that same village.

Joanna and her other daughters (including two born of a Mura father), for their part, had remained with the Muras somewhere

deep in the Autazes. There Ambrozio had embraced a Mura wife, with whom he had fled from that region when it was ravaged by the avenging Portuguese in 1765 -- taking his mother and sisters along with them. Not long afterwards, he had emerged as one of the leaders of the band of Muras based at Lake Amaná near the lower Japurá, who lived there for nearly two decades by raiding the Portuguese settlements along the Solimões and Negro. Among his companions at the time of the peace negotiations, the Portuguese noted, was an old man with white hair and matted beard -- presumably a person of mixed race -- of whom it was said that had been captured by the Muras from the old Jesuit mission of Trocano on the Madeira many years before, and who must have married one of Ambrozio's sisters, since he identified during the peace talks as his brother-in-law.

Ambrozio was a taller and more muscular man than the Portuguese officer who described him for us, who in fact found him quite fearsome to behold. Although his own followers seemed to number no more than about a hundred, this chief appeared to the officer to enjoy great respect among a large portion of the Muras. It was rumored, however, that other bands such as those based on the Juruá river, and some remaining in the Autazes, would have nothing to do with the enterprising Ambrozio; those Muras were deeply suspicious still of what he was trying to accomplish with the Portuguese. There appeared to exist no central organization of any kind among the Mura except (the Portuguese officer surmised) for some form of temporary leadership by a principal chief in times of war. Ambrozio himself was perhaps such a figure of sometime

authority, as was suggested by his own confidence in his ability to visit other branches of the tribe and persuade their leaders (or even oblige them by threatening retaliation) to make peace with an old enemy. The Portuguese made it clear in their correspondence that for all of his apparent ability they held this Ambrozio (a "confessed killer and thief") in very low regard. But they were hopeful either that he would succeed in bringing about the desired suspension of hostilities, or that he would create such tensions between the Mura bands that they would exhaust themselves for a while by fighting against one another.

Ambrozio spoke the lingua geral very haltingly, and it soon became clear that he had to be assisted in every stage of these negotiations by Joanna and his sisters. These women are not described, and the Portuguese observers do not report having asked any questions of them. But they did speak the language of the domestic Indians fluently; and they appeared even to have taught it to their Mura husbands. Joanna, in particular, appears to have played a key role throughout the peace-making process. Ambrozio was at pains to keep her close to him whenever he was obliged to deal with the Portuguese; and he seems to have been influenced in his decisions by what was apparently her hankering for the old domestic Indian way of life. The old lady proved to be an enthusiastic church-goer whenever they visited the settlements; and it was this predilection that was presumably responsible for one of the principal symbolic events of this time of transition.

One day in June, 1785, after having spent three days in joyful dancing and drunkenness (perhaps with old friends from mission

days) on the beach at Nogueira, a group of Mura parents came forth in apparent spontaneity to offer twenty of their children for baptism by the village priest there. Among these parents was Ambrozio himself, for whose child the Portuguese commander himself must have stood as godfather -- given the fact that later he was able to refer to the chief (with an unseemly measure of irony) as his compadre. The only Muras who had received the Christian sacraments before that time had been captive women and children; but at this the experience nevertheless seemed to agree with them, because a few months later another mass baptism occurred under similar circumstances at Nogueira. On that occasion, moreover, at least one Mura boy was left in the village by his chiefly father to be raised as a Christian by the Portuguese!

The Portuguese commander thought that it was a good sign of the seriousness of the Muras' intentions that when Ambrozio and his fellow chiefs made these visits to Ega, they would bring large parties of women and girls along with them. In general these women seem to have been more attracted by domestic Indian life, and in particular by the religious festivals and obligations which it involved, than were the hard-bitten Mura men with their recollections of decades of unrelenting warfare. One explanation of this may be that the women were not themselves veterans of combat, and that thanks to the ferocity of their husbands most of them had not even suffered personally the eruption of a party of Portuguese soldiers into their home villages. Another is that a considerable number of these women (we cannot know what proportion of the whole) had themselves been born and

raised in the Portuguese settlements before entering into the very different world of Mura society.

A significant feature of the new relationship which Ambrozio sought to forge with the Portuguese seems to have been direct participation by the Muras in the ongoing process of the descimento (voluntary or involuntary resettlement) of Indians from the still-independent tribes into villages responsible to the Indian Directorate. This procedure, evolved alongside the Indian slave trade, had served as the essential remedy for chronic desertion, and for the depopulation of domestic Indian settlements by epidemic disease, since the earliest days of the colony in Pará. Domestic Indian chiefs had traditionally taken an active role in this work, as a means of proving their loyalty to the Portuguese authorities while at the same time enlarging the populations subject to their (however severely limited) authority. The Muras, for their part, had an even more extensive experience than the inhabitants of domestic Indian settlements, at the practice of incorporating into their numbers a steady stream of new people recruited (or kidnapped) from the villages of their enemies.

On this occasion Ambrozio made it clear that he intended to populate his new settlement on Lake Amaná with perhaps a thousand people, including among them not only a number of Muras recruited from various places, but also some Indians of the Jumaná tribe from the middle Japurá valley -- the very people whose manioc gardens he and his men had set off to destroy just a few months previously. The commander at Ega interviewed separately a Jumaná chief whom Ambrozio had brought along with him; and he learned

from him that the Jumanás, living as they did in constant fear of the Muras, had on several previous occasions asked for resettlement at Maripí, where they had been willing to accept Mathias Fernandes' authority and protection. But Fernandes had been unable to provide them right away with the tools and sustenance that descimento would require; and as a result, rather than endure further attacks, they were prepared now to cast their lot with the Muras!

A list of the merchandise that was made available by the government for exchange with the Muras during this period of adjustment tells a good deal about the material basis for this peace-making. There were axes, sickles, spades, knives of various kinds, metal arrowheads, fishhooks, several varieties of harpoon points for the different Amazon fisheries, straight razors, Jew's harps, candles, mirrors, bolts of ordinary homespun cotton cloth and (since a major concern of the Portuguese was to get the naked Mura interested in the idea of clothing), lengths of cloth made up into shirts, pants and frocks. Fancier outfits with buttons and buckles were provided for the chiefs, and shoes and broad-brimmed hats to go with them. Later on a significant addition to this list was small barrels of white-lightening rum from the sugar estates of Pará -- a substance to which both settlers and domestic Indians in colonial Amazonia were generally addicted, and which quickly found its place on the new list of necessities for Mura life as well.

It will be seen that a fascination with "trinkets" had little to do with this pattern of exchange (though after a time it did appear that Mura chiefs were sometimes piqued to note that others had fancier suits of clothing than their own). The Muras, having become

accustomed to and eventually dependent upon European implements through a generation of raiding, had now broken through (presumably with a bit of orientation from their comrades born in the mission stations), to a more efficient means of obtaining these goods. As an experiment, and with some considerable reservations as it turned out, they were willing to offer limited periods of labor service to the hated Portuguese in exchange for these much-valued goods -- so long as this had them working at familiar tasks and under their own supervision, as fishermen or canoe-builders or gatherers of turtles and sarsaparilla.

Once Ambrozio's peace-making process was underway, an additional development seems to have pushed most even the more recalcitrant Mura chiefs into giving this solution a try. This was the eruption into the lower Madeira valley and Autazes of the Muras' feared enemies the Mundurucú, inhabitants of the Tapajós valley, early in 1786. These fierce warriors had pushed westward to do battle with both the Portuguese and Muras on the Madeira not many years before, and on this occasion they seem for the first time to have wrought havoc among the Muras in their home country. The Mundurucú were to keep up their pressure on the remaining Mura settlements in the Autazes each year thenceforth until their own "pacification" by the Portuguese in 1795. In the Mundurucú, the Mura warriors had for the first time met their match; and this continuing threat was an additional motivation for the one-time "corsairs" of the river to settle themselves into larger and more stable communities, and to locate these communities in places not

too far removed from the Portuguese garrisons which might help to defend them.

At Borba on the Madeira, hard by the camps of the Mundurucú, the peacemaking took a somewhat different form. There a mixed group of "Muras" from several tribes sought refuge from the terrible enemy by settling in the outskirts of the ex-mission village itself. In Borba some of them joined fellow tribesmen who had settled there with the Portuguese long before; and a number of people who had lived for a long time as captives of the Muras were reunited their with their relatives. Like the members of Mura bands settling elsewhere, these people opened manioc gardens in the nearby forests; and by late 1787 there were nearly a thousand of them living in multifamily houses on the outskirts of the town. But Borba was located nearer to the old home territory of the Muras, and here even the ostensibly "pacified" Muras made a point of maintaining their contacts with relatives remaining in the Autazes -- the people who still could not be persuaded, even in the face of threat from the Mundurucú, to resettle under any form of Portuguese tutelage. The authorities at Borba complained for several years afterwards that "their" Muras would return regularly to their own country to fish, hunt, manufacture their distinctive bark canoes and enjoy the festivals and rituals of their people -- far, for a time, from the continuing cold scrutiny, and the uncongenial regulations, of the domestic Indians and Portuguese among whom they had been obliged to resettle.

Conclusions.

The history of the Mura from the 1790's forward appears to be even more difficult to reconstruct than their history during the 18th century. This is because, once they ceased to represent a threat to the very existence of the Portuguese settlements, they ceased also to occupy much space in the official correspondence of the Captaincy of the Rio Negro. No enterprise of the 19th century relied to any substantial degree on Mura labor, or on the products of the Muras' domestic economy; no missionary labored among them, to report to the outside world on the progress of their directed cultural change. During the first quarter of the 19th century, moreover, the Captaincy itself fell onto hard times. Insignificant in population and lacking any immediately exploitable resources, it failed to produce revenues of any importance. Therefore, it subsisted as a backwater of little interest to the colonial government. This was, if possible, even truer once the Portuguese Court relocated from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1808; it was truer still after the declaration of Brazil's independence, during the decades in which energies of the imperial government focussed on the consolidation of its authority. The few public functionaries who did find themselves lamenting the unkind fate that had sent them to the banks of the Negro, were for the most part people of limited ability and energy. They were themselves badly informed about the affairs of the province, and seldom in a position to have much influence in shaping them. Times such as those, lamentable as they might have appeared to officials and to the more civic-minded citizens, were presumably the best times imaginable at this point by the Muras -- and for others like them in the sectors of society for which that government was best which

governed least. For a few years at least, they could be left to their own devices.

The German scientific travellers Johann von Spix and C.F. von Martius, who visited the central Amazon valley in 1819, reported then that the Muras had not made good use of the opportunities opened up to them by the "pacification" of 1784. Those of that day appeared to be the least "civilized," if perhaps still the most numerous, of the indigenous peoples of that region. Greatly diminished in confidence and vigor as well as in numbers by their war with the Mundurucú (and visibly terrified by the sight of the single guide from that tribe who accompanied the travellers), the Muras shunned contacts with outsiders of any kind and stayed largely out of sight. They travelled about in small bands of two or three dozen naked "thieves and vagabonds" (the image purveyed is akin to that of the Gypsies in European society) -- making camp for a time wherever they could fish or harpoon a few manatee or collect the eggs of turtles in peace. They would trade a few fish or turtles with the occasional passer-by, for a knife or a bottle of rum; but in general they seemed both surly and indolent as well as filthy to the outsider -- "more of an annoyance than a danger" to the "respectable" citizens of the province. Their houses and in general their possessions were the most rudimentary the travellers had found anywhere in Amazonia. Neither men nor women used clothing of any kind; their bark canoes, their crudely woven hammocks and their weapons appeared to be the same as they had been before the Muras' half-century of intense interaction through war and peace with the Portuguese. At that time, on the eve of

Brazilian independence and following a century of regular contact with others, they still found it difficult to express themselves in the lingua geral -- something which must in itself be taken as a sign that since 1784 they had for the most part succeeded in staying out of the dependent labor force of the colony. "Only the love of strong liquor was sufficient to make them willing to serve the whites for even a short period of time." (26)

During the 1830's, as a result of the political turmoil which followed on the movement for independence in Pará, the entire Amazonian region was convulsed by rebellion. The Cabanagem, as this uprising was called, was originally aimed at driving the European Portuguese interests out of Amazonia, and replacing them with those of a native-born elite. Quickly, however, the struggle was transformed by popular forces into a "caste war" in which the working poor and the economically marginalized fought to take vengeance on the comfortable, while at the same time freeing themselves of the burden of forced labor. In the central Amazon valley, not surprisingly, a large number of Muras joined the rebel forces; they shared in the looting, burning and killing for a time, and they shared later in the terrible suffering occasioned by a bloody repression. (27)

During the last half of the 19th century and first decade of the 20th, the Amazon Valley experienced the "rubber boom" through which it was joined decisively to the capitalist world economy. (28) As a consequence it was repopulated by immigrants from other parts of Brazil and abroad, and endowed with political and economic institutions which were for the first time capable of

bringing about change at the local level, and doing so everywhere in the region. Rather than joining in the effort to extract rubber from the rainforest, the surviving Muras seem to have had as little as possible to do with this process, clinging to its margins and avoiding the hard life and merciless exploitation of the rubber tappers. Their numbers continued to decline, the result presumably of increasing intermarriage and resettlement in the Brazilian towns, as well as of susceptibility to alcoholism and disease. In the 1920's the ethnographers Nimuendajú and Tastevin could speak of the few remaining Muras as members of an identifiable ethnic group, though by that time there were only a few surviving speakers of their language. (29) Their descendents today appear no longer to be distinguishable as Muras.

The grandparents of the rapidly-declining Muras of the 19th century had been ferocious in their resistance to the establishment of the colonialist system in central Amazonia, and then, all of a sudden, remarkably cool-headed about making their peace with it. How are we to explain this? The peace of 1785 was in no way forced upon the Muras by the diplomacy of the Portuguese, and still less by their military might. Among the Muras of that day, it appears that there were persistent voices which counselled against any form of accommodation with the white men, and warned that the price of weakness could only be subjection to their system of forced labor -- if not death from their terrible diseases. Hostilities between these long-time antagonists had been undiminished right down to the eve of the appearance of the emissaries at Maripí. Their mutual hatred

was great, as it continued to be -- so far as we can tell -- for many decades after the declaration of peace.

Nimuendajú concluded from a reading of the published documents that the Muras had been greatly weakened by epidemics before they agreed to their peaceful resettlement, that at that time they were already on the run and in need of protection against the Mundurucú, and that they had been "softened up" by the presence of foreign elements (that is, of captives such as Ambrozio) among them. Epidemics are indeed a likely hypothesis, given their large role in the general history of the Indians of Amazonia; but there is as yet no documentary evidence of the Muras' particular experience with them. Generally speaking, epidemics seem to have struck the "domestic Indians" hardest in colonial Amazonia; distance from the Portuguese missions and other settlements, such as that which the Muras were careful to maintain, was a partially successful defense against them. In this regard, it is also noteworthy that the Muras' most active hostilities against the Portuguese were launched less than a decade after the most devastating episode in the entire disease history of the Amazon valley -- the measles and smallpox epidemics of the 1740's.

The Mundurucú were to prove a terrible enemy indeed; and they did wreak havoc among the Mura living anywhere near the lower Madeira river beginning sometime in 1786. But had they been a major cause for the Muras' decision for peace in 1784, their approach to the Portuguese would presumably have been made at Borba on the Madeira, rather than five hundred miles away on the river Japurá. The first ambassadors would surely have asked the

Portuguese for protection against the Mundurucú. The Mundurucú were a scourge to several of the Mura settlements that resulted from the decision for peace; but they do not appear to have been a chief cause of the decision itself. Two other factors suggest themselves as crucial to an explanation for the surprising termination of the Portuguese-Mura War.

In the first place the Portuguese, who had seemed to be kept permanently on the run by the Mura attacks of the 1760's and 70's, were present on the Solimões in greater numbers than ever by 1784; and they had been joined there by their Spanish colleagues as well. These two parties did not in fact have very cordial relations with one another; and neither separately nor collectively did they represent any immediate military threat to the Muras; but the Muras had no way of knowing that, and they cannot have failed to notice the difference in the numbers, the military weaponry and the mobility within the region of their armed enemies -- particularly in the vicinity of the headquarters village of Ega near the mouth of the Japurá.

On the other hand, among the Muras a generation of adopted people familiar with some of the relative comforts of settled life had grown up and become influential. Among these "neo-Muras" were a disproportionately large number of women, many of whom must have been influential in the thinking of their Mura husbands. War was as exhausting an enterprise for the Muras as for any other people, no matter how successful they might be at it. One of its features was adventure and perhaps glory for the men; but another was the permanent fear of the destruction of Mura settlements by

Portuguese soldiers bent on killing the men and enslaving the women and children. Mura men, moreover, appear to have been absent from their homes during a large part of each year during the decades of unceasing warfare; and they were therefore in no position to contribute to the feeding or rearing of their children. In these circumstances there could be no security, and no full enjoyment of the community's life by the women and children. The future of the Muras as a society was, in fact, seriously at risk. Women, and in particular the captive women who had been raised in the domestic Indian settlements, cannot have looked upon such a situation with complacency. They cannot, over the long run, have maintained any wholehearted support for what we may presume were the Mura warriors' arguments, that war against those very settlements was both viable and justifiable as a permanent way of life.

The objective to be pursued in dealings of any kind with the white colonialists and their domestic Indian lackeys, was to gain access to their tools and other useful goods without paying the price in loss of freedom and subjection to a system of forced labor which the colonized Indians had universally been obliged to pay. The peace of 1784 may perhaps best be understood as a calculated move by men and women tired of war, spurred on by concern for the welfare of their children, to acquire the desired trade goods and food staples on a more regular basis and with less risk, while retaining the desired measure of social and political autonomy and the freedom to spend their days as the Muras saw fit, and

concentrate their energies on the enjoyment and reproduction of the Mura way of life.

Notes:

1. On Apache resistance see Jack D. Forbes, Apache, Navajo & Spaniard (Norman, 1960); Edward H. Spicer, Cycles of Conquest (Tucson, 1962) and Michael E. Melody's bibliography The Apaches (Bloomington, 1977). On that of the Araucanians, see Louis C. Faron, The Mapuche Indians of Chile (NY, 1968) and other works; Alvaro Jara, Guerra y sociedad en Chile (Santiago, 1971) and José Bengoa, Historia del pueblo mapuche, siglos xix y xx (Santiago, 1985).
2. Some attention is given to Mura history in John Hemming, Red Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians, 1500-1760 (Cambridge MA, 1978) and Amazon Frontier: The Defeat of the Brazilian Indians (Cambridge MA, 1987), passim, and in Gunter Kroemer, Cuxiuara: O Purús dos indígenas (São Paulo, 1985), esp. pp. 30-40.
3. Background information is from my unpublished dissertation, "A Rich Realm of Nature Destroyed: The Central Amazon Valley, 1650-1750" (Wisconsin, 1974), which explores social history in the days of the Indian slave trade but omits the history of the Mura.
4. José Gonçalves da Fonseca, "Primeira exploração dos rios Madeira e Guaporé...em 1749," in Candido Mendes de Almeida (ed.) Memórias para a história do Extincto Estado do Maranhão II (Rio de Janeiro, 1874), p. 34; P. José Monteiro de Noronha, "Roteiro da viagem da cidade do Pará até as últimas colónias dos...rios

Amazonas e Negro..." [1768] in Collecção de notícias para a história e geografia das nações ultramarinas VI (Lisboa, 1856), p. 33; Alípio Bandeira, A cruz indígena (Porto Alegre, 1926), drawn ostensibly from Torá oral tradition; Anísio Jobim, O Amazonas (São Paulo, 1957).

5. Serafim Leite, S.J. Historia da Companhia de Jesús no Brasil[hereafter HCJB] Vol. III (Lisboa/Rio de Janeiro, 1943), pp. 381-401; Gov. Alexandre de Sousa Freire, "Relação das fazendas das ordens religiosas do Pará [n.d. 1727?], in Archivo Histórico Ultramarino [AHU], Lisbon, Pará Cx 3.

6. David M. Davidson, "Rivers and Empire: The Madeira Route and the Incorporation of the Brazilian Far West, 1737-1808" (unpub. PhD. Yale, 1970), chap. 1; Gov. João de Abreu Castelobranco, Ordem (Belem 9 sep 1738), Biblioteca e Archivo Publico do Pará [BAPP] 985, no. 92; João Daniel, S.J. Tesouro descoberto no Rio Amazonas [ca. 1760] (2 vols.; Rio de Janeiro, 1976), vol. I, pp. 264-65; Robert Southey, History of Brazil (London, 1819), vol. III, pp. 338-40.

7. Hemming Frontier, p. 19.

8. Fonseca, pp. 306-9. Cf. Kurt Nimuendajú, "The Mura and Piraha," in Julian H. Steward (ed.) Handbook of South American Indians III (Washington, 1946), p. 257.

9. Daniel vols. I, pp. 264-65; & II, pp. 17 & 62-63.

10. For a general view see Colin MacLachlan, "The Indian Directorate: forced acculturation in Portuguese America (1757-1799)," The Americas 28,4 (apr 1972): 357-87.

11. Gov. Francisco de Mendonça Gurjão-King (Pará, 26 apr 1749), AHU Maranhão Cx 32; Theodózio de Chermont, "Memória dos mais

terríveis contágios..." in Alexandre Rodrigues Ferreira, "Diário da Viagem Filosófica pela Capitania de São José do Rio Negro...[1786]," Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro [RIHGB] 48,1 (1885), pp. 29-30; cf. Juan de Velasco S.J. Historia del Reino de Quito en la América Meridional (3rd ed. Quito, 1960) III, pp. 820-21.

12. Joaquim de Melo e Povoas-João de Melo e Castro (Barcelos, 4 jan 1759), BAPP 13 doc. 1. This section is based primarily on the voluminous correspondence from the Rio Negro during these years which is now preserved in the BAPP.

13. Francisco Xavier Ribeiro de Sampaio, Diário da viagem em visita, e correição das povoações da capitania de São Jozé do Rio Negro fez o ouvidor....no anno de 1774 e 1775 (Lisboa, 1825), passim. This detailed report on the state of the Captaincy makes repeated reference to the Mura and advocates their extermination.

14. Henrique J. Wilkens-João Pereira Caldas (Ega, 5 jul 1782), AHU Rio Negro Cx 3 doc 7.

15. Joaquim Tinoco Valente-Fernando da Costa Ataide Teive (Barcelos 8 dec 1765), BAPP 63 doc. 120 lists fifty such slaves of whom none were adult men, divided one or two per soldier and resettled in nine different towns of the Captaincy.

16. Matias Fernandes-Valente (Japurá, 12 apr 1778) & Valente-Caldas (Barcelos, 30 jan 1779), BAPP 189 docs 10 & 29.

17. Caldas, Memória cited in Ferreira, "Diário...," RIHGB 50,2 (1887), p. 55.

18. Gonçalves-Albuquerque (Barcelos 18 jun 1785), BAPP 197 doc 39.

19. Blacks were few in colonial Amazonia (especially before the late 18th century), because Indian slaves were cheaper and had the requisite skills suitable for productive labor and survival in Amazonia, and because few settlers of Pará had the means to import slaves from Africa. See Colin M. Maclachlan, "African slave trade & economic development in Amazonia, 1700-1800," in Robert B. Toplin (ed.) *Slavery & Race Relations in Latin America* (Westport CT, 1974), pp. 122-45 & Vicente Salles, *O negro no Pará sob o regime da escravidão* (Rio de Janeiro, 1971).

20. Caldas-Martinho de Melo e Castro (Barcelos, 13 nov 1782), AHU Rio Negro Cx 3 doc 9.

21. Henrique João Wilkens, *A Muhraida, ou a conversão, e reconciliação do gentio-Muhra* [1789] (Lisboa, 1819). Key documents of the peace process were compiled by the scientific traveller Alexandre Rodrigues Ferreira, present in the Capitania when it occurred. See his *Viagem Filosofica pelas Capitanias do Grão Pará, Rio Negro, Mato Grosso e Cuiabá. Memórias: Antropologia* (Rio de Janeiro, 1974), pp. 103-61, from which most of the information in this section is taken. This text is also found in the more complete version of this great work, published in the RIHGB (see note 11 above).

22. For a picture of this time and place see Robert C. Smith, "Requena and the Japurá: some 18th-century watercolors of the Amazon and other rivers," *The Americas* 3 (1946):31-65; and my "Juan de Silva y Fernando Rojas; baqueanos africanos de la selva americana," in D.G. Sweet & G.B. Nash (eds.) *Lucha por la supervivencia en la America colonial* (México, 1987), pp. 234-47.

23. Manuel José Valadão-Caldas (Maripí, 12 jul 1784), in Ferreira, *Viagem*, pp. 105-6.
24. The approach of the Muras to the Director of Ayrão was reported in detail by Alexandre Rodrigues Ferreira, whose impressions of the people and their material culture may be found in his "Memória sobre o gentio Mura," reproduced in the *Viagem Filosófica... Antropologia* (Rio de Janeiro, 1976), pp. 59-67.
25. See my "Francisca: Indian Slave," in D. G. Sweet & G. B. Nash (eds.) *Struggle & Survival in Colonial America* (Berkeley, 1981), pp. 274-91.
26. J.B. von Spix & C.F.P. von Martius, *Viagem pelo Brasil* (orig. Munich, 1823; Port. trans. São Paulo, 1976) III, pp. 109-12, 222-23, 286-7.
27. On the Cabanagem, see Robin Anderson, "The caboclo as revolutionary: the cabanagem revolt, 1835-1836," in Eugene P. Parker (ed.) *The Amazon Caboclo: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Studies in Third World Societies 32; Williamsburg, 1985), pp. 51-87; Júlio José Chiavenato, *Cabanagem. O povo no poder* (São Paulo, 1984) & Carlos de Araujo Moreira Neto, *Índios da Amazonia: de maioria a minoria (1750-1850)* (Petropolis, 1988), esp.
28. See Barbara Weinstein, *The Amazon Rubber Boom, 1850-1920* (Stanford, 1983).
29. Nimuendajú, op. cit.; Constant Tastevin, "Les indiens Mura de la région de l'Autaz (Haut-Amazone)," *L'anthropologie* (Paris) 33 (1923):509-33.

